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NOTES
TRUTH BY ORDEAL: THE GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF
POLYGRAPHY
WILLIAM E. PLOSS
I. THE ART OF POLYGRAPHY
In pursuit of justice, man has fashioned various devices to better
discern when other men are not telling the truth. The lantern of
Diogenes,' trial-by-ordeal, 2 and the Anglo-Saxon jury trial repre-
sent, respectively, mythical, primitive, and modern methods for
determining veracity. Comparison of trial-by-ordeal with the mod-
ern jury trial shows that substantial progress has been made in
jurisprudential factfinding. Yet progress is not perfection. Though
many jurists might dispute that "jurisprudence [is] the science of
the human lie,"3 few would expect the flame of Diogenes' lantern
to expire, or even flicker, in a contemporary courtroom. But the
modern polygraph represents the most reliable "truth machine"
ever invented and could, if properly employed, greatly reduce cur-
rent cynicism about the veracity of testimony in judicial proceed-
ings.
A. History and Theory
The history of the polygraph is the history of modern medical
instrumentation. The polygraph's three detection compo-
nents-which monitor changes in blood pressure and pulse rate,4
1. Diogenes, a leader of the Greek philosophical sect known as the Cynics, lived an ascetic
life which exemplified the sect's creed of stoic self-sufficiency and rejection of luxury. There
are many legends about Diogenes, one of which portrays him as a man dedicated to exposing
the falsity of most conventional standards and beliefs. Hence his famous search for an honest
man in broad daylight with a lighted lantern. One version of this legend has it that upon
discovering an honest man, the flame in the lantern would go out. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
III MICROPAEDIA 558 (1974).
2. "Trial-by-ordeal" was a practice used by primitive people to detect deception. The
accused underwent a physical ordeal. If he was successful and unharmed, he was presumed
innocent (or truthful). See Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection (pt. 1), 29 J. CruM. L.C. &
P.S. 848, 850 (1939), for an interesting account of often-used ordeals.
3. THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 605 (G. Seldes ed. 1960). The phrase quoted is from a work by
Mikhail Bakunin. The complete quote reads: "Theology is the science of the divine lie,
jurisprudence the science of the human lie, and metaphysics and idealistic philosophy the
science of any half-lie."
4. Faivre (1856) made the first direct measurement of human blood pressure, and Galileo
'(1581) is credited with inventing the first objective method to count the human pulse. Clen-
dening, The History of Certain Medical Instruments, 4 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 176-89
(1931), cited in Trovillo, supra note 2, at 855-56.
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respiration, 5 and galvanic skin response-were invented as separate
instruments and, at first, were used exclusively for medical diagno-
sis and research. Not until the late nineteenth century were any of
these instruments used to determine veracity Furthermore, not
until the early 1930's were these instruments combined in a single
device. This device was the modern polygraph, which has remained
essentially unchanged.8
Although the theoretical and scientific basis of the polygraph's
physiological recording components is well understood and univer-
sally accepted, the efficacy of using these instruments in a man-
machine paradigm to detect deception has yet to receive widespread
5. Some of the earliest work on the influence of emotions on respiration was done by an
Italian physiologist named Mossa. Trovillo, supra note 2, at 858.
6. The galvanic skin response (also known as the psychogalvanic reflex) takes its name
from Galvani, an Italian physiologist who published a paper on animal electricity in 1791.
Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection (pt. 2), 30 J. CriM. L.C. & P.S. 104 (1939). The response
is defined as a change in the electrical properties of the body (measured as a change in
resistance to the flow of electrical current across the palms of the hands or soles of the feet)
following noxious stimulation, stimulation that produces emotional reaction, and, to some
extent, stimulation that attracts the subject's attention and leads to an aroused alertness.
The response appears about two seconds after stimulation, rises to a maximum after two to
ten seconds, and subsides at about the same rate. Modern recording instruments are varia-
tions of the original device designed in 1888 by the French physician Fere. ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, VIII MICROPAEDIA 271-72 (1974).
7. Cesare Lombroso was the first person to use a scientific instrument for the purpose of
detecting deception. In 1895, Lombroso published the results of experiments to determine the
guilt or innocence of criminal suspects based upon changes in their blood pressure when
questioned about the crime under investigation. Lombroso's instrument was relatively crude,
but his success in detecting deception was duplicated as early as 1915 by William Marston,
who used an ordinary sphygmomanometer-the same instrument commonly used by doctors
to measure a patient's blood pressure.
In 1914, Vittorio Benussi published his research on respiration changes as indicia of decep-
tion. A few years later, Harold Burtt partially confirmed Benussi's results and improved upon
Benussi's technique. J. Rm & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEroN 2-3 (2d ed. 1977).
Continuing his work in veracity determination, William Marston reported in 1917 that he
and his colleagues used galvanic skin response (GSR) measurements to detect liars for the
Army Intelligence Service. Trovillo, supra note 6, at 106.
Scientific efforts to determine veracity began about the turn of the century and have
considered many variables, including the shunting of blood supplies from one body part to
another and changes in hand volume, reaction time to word associations, respiratory changes,
blood pressure, hand tremors, electroencephalographic activity, pupil size, oculamotor activ-
ity, voice, oxygen saturation of the blood, and behavioral symptoms. Barland & Raskin,
Detection of Deception, in ELECrRODERMAL ACTrvTY IN PsYC HOLOGicAL RESEARCH 417, 419 (W.
Prokasy & D. Raskin eds. 1973). For an excellent summary of experimental results using these
measures, see Orne, Thackray, & Paskewitz, On the detection of deception: A model for the
study of the physiological effects of psychological stimuli, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOrY
743 (N. Greenfield & R. Sternbach eds. 1972), as cited in Barland & Raskin, supra at 419,
475.
8. See J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 7, at 4; Trovillo, supra note 6, at 109. The contempo-
rary polygraph manufactured for field use has remained basically unchanged since 1935, with
the only modifications being a reduction in size and weight and the use of transistors instead
of tubes in the electrodermal (GSR) section.
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theoretical support.9 Despite continuing scholarly debate over po-
lygraphy's theoretical underpinnings, however, its utility in detect-
ing deception is widely recognized and supported by a large body
of empirical data. 0
B. Accuracy and Reliability
Addressing the question of polygraphy's accuracy, critics" and
proponents12 alike agree that "'the most important factor involved
in the use of any [polygraph] is the ability, experience, education,
and integrity of the examiner himself.' ,,13 In response to charges of
widespread incompetence, polygraphists have formed associations
which attempt to provide "quality control" for professional examin-
ers by performing continuing educational and self-policing func-
tions for their members. 15 In some jurisdictions, due to steadily in-
creasing polygraphy use, legislation controlling the polygraph has
augmented attempts by polygraphists at self-regulation.16
9. Four major theories of lie detection are summarized in Barland & Raskin, supra note
7, at 445-47: (1) The conditioned response theory holds that the relevant questions are condi-
tioned verbal stimuli which elicit emotional responses related to the subject's past experience.
The more traumatic the previous experience, the greater the autonomic response. (2) The
conflict theory suggests that when two incompatible reaction tendencies are aroused simulta-
neously (the tendency to lie or to be truthful), a large physiological disturbance occurs. (3)
The punishment theory sees a subject's fear of detection and subsequent punishment as
responsible for measurable physiological responses. (4) The arousal theory avoids the use of
emotions and states simply that detection occurs because of the differential arousal value of
the various stimuli.
10. See id. at 418. This essay presents an excellent summary of polygraphy research in
both field and laboratory settings. It also contains an extensive bibliography of polygraphy
readings.
11. See Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detec-
tion, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 707 (1961). Skolnick presents a valuable critical analysis of polygraphy
theory and technique, although some of his major arguments against polygraphy have been
rebutted by subsequent research.
12. See United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27, 31 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (testimony of John
Reid). Reid, a leading polygraphy authority, originally believed the polygraphy art to be too
primitive for the courts legitimately to sanction test results. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note
7, at 314. But only 13 years later, while acknowledging that the basic polygraphy apparatus
had not changed, Reid reversed his position and began advocating judicial acceptance of
polygraphy results because of improved experience, competency, and reliability of polygraph
examiners. 356 F. Supp. at 31.
13. United States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (S.D. Cal.) (brackets in original),
affl'd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907 (1973). Although the DeBetham
trial court disallowed introduction of polygraph results in a nonjury trial, it noted that
polygraphy was extremely accurate if conducted by a competent examiner. 348 F. Supp. at
1384-85.
14. Skolnick, supra note 11.
15. E.g., The American Polygraph Association (APA), which publishes a newsletter, pro-
vides recognition for outstanding members and sets standards for polygraphy schools and
practitioners.
16. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 493.40-56 (1977), which regulate (1) equipment (at least two
detection components, including cardiovascular and respiration monitoring are required); (2)
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Although the importance of a qualified examiner cannot be
stressed too much, such emphasis is intended only as a caveat. It is
not intended to reveal a fatal flaw in the process of lie detection.
Indeed, professional polygraphists estimate polygraphy's accuracy
to be nearly flawless, and more objective observers claim an accu-
racy of over ninety percent 7 when the examination is administered
by a competent examiner." Yet, despite polygraphy's well-
documented accuracy, it is important to note that the feasibility of
using any device to determine veracity turns on two factors: (1) the
characteristics of the test population,"5 and (2) the perceived rela-
education (four-year college degree or high school diploma and five years' experience as an
investigator or detective with a governmental agency are required); (3) training (at least six
weeks' formal polygraph training at a school recognized by the state plus a one-year intern-
ship to be served under the supervision of a licensed examiner are required); and (4) financial
responsibility (a surety bond is required).
As of 1975, states which had similar laws regulating polygraph examiners included: Arkan-
sas, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Texas,
and Virginia. Tarlow, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining
Credibility in a Perjury-Plagued System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 956 n.188 (1975).
17. Although accuracy estimates are often over 95%, most testimony about the accuracy
of the procedure consists of the estimates of veteran operators. Though these operators are
certainly experienced, their estimates are often made without proper methodological controls.
See Tarlow, supra note 16, at 928 n;58, and Note, Polygraphy: Short Circuit to Truth?, 29
U. FLA. L. REv. 286, 290 n.27 (1977), for citations and estimates. Perhaps the best discussion
of modern scientific studies made to determine polygraphy's accuracy is presented by Bar-
land & Raskin, supra note 7.
18. For purposes of this note, a "competent examiner" is one who has graduated from one
of the polygraphy schools sanctioned by the APA and who also meets applicable state licens-
ing requirements.
19. The characteristics referred to are not those which affect individual responsivity-i.e.,
age (children are difficult to test reliably); physical disorder (cardiac or respiratory disorders
produce unusual and difficult-to-interpret records); or mental disorder (low IQ and psychotic
or neurotic persons cannot be reliably tested)-but rather those characteristics which are the
ultimate objectives, that is, whether or not the individual is lying. J. Rgm & F. INAu, supra
note 7, at 233-253. Although polygraphy's accuracy is greater than 90%, it is easily shown
that the proportion of deceptive persons in the test population will affect the conditional
accuracy of test results. For example, consider the following test populations:
A, B, C, D, E = Test populations of 100
a = Unconditional accuracy
a' = Conditional accuracy
L = Liars
T = Truthtellers
c = Correct
i = Incorrect
A B C D E
C i ci ci ci c i
L:100 90 0 L:90 81 1 L:50 45 5 L:AO 9 9 L: 0 0 0
T: 0 0 10 T:10 9 9 T:50 45 5 T:90 81 1 T:100 90 10
a' - 100% a' = 98.8% a' = 90% a' =- 5 0% a' = 0%
a 90% a - 90% a = 90% a = 90% a 90%
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tive costs of error. 0 But since these limitations apply to any means
of detection-including a modern jury trial-polygraphy's uniquely
high degree of accuracy and reliability have led to its widespread
use.
C. Current Extralegal Uses
As early as 1938, many police departments were using a less com-
plex version of the modern polygraph as an investigative and inter-
rogative aid.2 By 1958, polygraph use and acceptance had mush-
roomed so much that one author stated:
Stores, banks, insurance companies and industry widely utilize
the device. Moreover, all branches of the armed forces have admin-
istered the lie detector in criminal work at some time, and several
federal agencies have used the machine to test the loyalty and
a a
100xA
90 lB
Percentage of
Liars in Test 80
Population 70
60
50 C
40
30
20
10 D
D
E
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Unconditional (a) and Conditional (a)
Accuracy (%)
Although the unconditional accuracy (a) for each of these populations is 90%, the condi-
tional accuracy (a'), or the percentage of those identified as deceptive who are correctly so
identified, varies with the percentage of deceptive persons in the test population. Conse-
quently, in population A, where all members are liars, the conditional accuracy is 100%-i. e.,
all those identified as liars are correctly labeled. But in population C, one-half of whom are
liars, the conditional accuracy is 90%, or equal to the unconditional accuracy. And where only
one-tenth the population are liars (D), the conditional accuracy drops to a chance level of
50%. (See graph for visual representaton of tabular data.) Since these population-dependent
effects are inherent in any detection paradigm, their presence does not militate against
polygraphy use but only against placing undue reliance on polygraphy's accuracy under
certain conditions. Thus, where the perceived relative costs of error are great (as in the
criminal justice system), or where a large proportion of the test population will be truthful
(as in employment screening situations), a polygraphist's judgment of deception should be
checked closely against other information. See generally Skolnick, supra note 11.
20. "Perceived" refers to the viewpoint of the test administrator, whether a potential
employer or a prosecutor, while "relative costs of error" refers to the costs (to the test adminis-
trator) of following an incorrect assessment.
21. Trovillo, supra note 2, at 879-80.
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integrity of both career personnel and applicants for employment.
The Atomic Energy Commission, for example, refused to consider
applicants for a selected group of "sensitive positions" at Oak
Ridge until they had submitted to a lie detector test.1
2
With minor exceptions, that description of use in 1958 remains
accurate today. Now even more federal agencies are employing po-
lygraphy, and use by law enforcement officials has reached the point
that most large police departments employ a full-time examiner.
The number of police examinations given is increasing as the costs
of routine "gumshoe" investigations continue to rise.23 In addition,
although precise data on the extent of business polygraph use is
difficult to obtain, it has been estimated that more than 400,000
tests were administered in 1972 in efforts to thwart an estimated
three billion dollars' loss that year from employee theft .2
Partly for that reason, the number of examiners rose fifty percent,
to 1,200, between 1968 and 1973.2 Furthermore, it appears that
polygraphy and business are destined to enjoy a long, close relation-
ship despite heavy opposition from the A.C.L.U. and several labor
unions.26 A 1976 article reported increased reliance on polygraphy by
business and industry but reported also that opposition to such
practices was mounting.? Eighteen states have already passed legis-
lation forbidding employers from requiring prospective employees to
submit to polygraph testing.28 Yet, despite strong labor union and
civil libertarian opposition, polygraph use in noncriminal areas con-
tinues to grow.? It has been suggested that the overwhelming reason
22. Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty of the "Lie Detector," 10 HASTINGS L.J. 47, 48
(1958) (footnotes omitted).
23. The 1964-65 Moss Subcommittee hearings disclosed that 19 federal agencies were
using the polygraph. R. FERGUSON, JR. & A. MILLER, THE POLYGRAPH IN COURT 22 (1973).
24. Truth or Consequences, TIME, Mar. 19, 1973, at 73-74.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Now a Furor Over Lie Detectors in Business, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 8, 1976,
at 68-70.
28. Those states which have enacted legislation proscribing preemployment polygraph
examination are: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington. See generally 119781 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL
(BNA) 451:4.
Although the conditional accuracy of polygraphy is lower than desirable in most preem-
ployment screening situations, this decreased accuracy does not seem to be the primary
reason why labor unions and A.C.L.U. representatives have opposed such testing. The reason
for their opposition seems to be that employers often abuse prospective (and current) employ-
ees by having the polygraph examiner probe personal, non-job-related areas such as drug use
and sexual preferences. See, e.g., Osterman v. Paulk, 387 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
29. Now a Furor Over Lie Detectors in Business, supra note 27, at 70.
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for such sustained growth is the steadily spiraling costs of employee
theft, which have reached an estimated six billion dollars a year.30
Perhaps the most intriguing modern use of polygraphy, however,
is in scientific research. For a long time, professional scientists were
reluctant to become associated with a "quasi-scientific" technique
the high priests of which were detectives. Recently, however, scien-
tists have recognized that polygraphy offers substantial promise for
the study of numerous questions in psychology and psycho-
physiology.3
In a country where businessmen, law enforcement officials,
security-conscious federal agencies, and scientists rely on polygraph
results,32 it seems anomalous that those same results are generally
barred from admission into evidence in courts of law. The remainder
of this note will examine the legal status of polygraph evidence,
focusing on origins of the current law and developing trends.
II. LEGAL STATUS
A. The Frye "General Acceptance" Rule: Perverted Precedent
Frye v. United States33 is the grandfather of all polygraphy cases
because it is the first reported attempt to introduce a deception test
into evidence .3 Since the Frye decision in 1923 marked the begin-
ning of an almost unswerving judicial hostility toward polygraph
evidence, it should be examined closely.
In Frye, a defendant accused of murder sought to introduce the
results of a "lie-detector" test into evidence. The test, administered
with an instrument which measured only systolic blood pressure,
indicated that the defendant was truthful when denying any knowl-
edge of the crime charged against him. In refusing to admit the
evidence, the Frye court enunciated its now famous "general accept-
ance" test for the introduction of novel scientific test results:
30. Lykken, Psychology & the Lie Detector Industry, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 725, 725 (1974).
Lykken reports that several million polygraph examinations are administered annually by
U.S. businessmen in efforts to curb these spiraling theft rates.
31. Barland & Raskin, supra note 7, at 418.
32. The United States is not alone in its use of polygraphy. Other countries using polygra-
phy are Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Puerto Rico, France, Israel, Iran, Japan, Nation-
alist China, Thailand, and the Philippines. Countries in which polygraphy is known not to
be used by the police include England, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
Iceland, the Soviet Union, and most of the other Communist-bloc countries. It is interesting
to note that the two most repressive dictatorships of this century, the Hitler and Stalin
regimes, did not use polygraphy, even though they were probably aware of its existence and
utility. Id. at 421.
33. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
34. Polygraphy: Short Circuit to Truth?, supra note 17, at 287.
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
In applying this test to the "lie-detector," the court concluded:
"We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological
and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development,
and experiments thus far made. ' 3 Thus, the Frye decision estab-
lished the "general acceptance" test and relegated the "lie-
detector" to the particular fields of psychology and physiology for
evaluation. The Frye court thereby made general acceptance of the
device by these scientific communities a prerequisite for judicial
acceptance.
B. Critique of the Frye Rule
Although more than fifty years have elapsed, Frye is still the
leading precedent cited to exclude polygraph evidence. Numerous
courts, following the guide of stare decisis, have adopted the same
conclusionary language.37 But these courts have failed to pause and
reflect on two critical facts. First, modem polygraphic instrumenta-
tion and technique are advanced far beyond the systolic blood pres-
sure "lie-detector" found wanting in Frye. Second, the Frye eviden-
tiary standard, although arguably correct for the machine before the
Frye court, is the correct standard for a court requested to take
judicial notice of scientific facts. However, this standard is im-
properly applied as a criterion for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. Yet even those courts which have remarked upon the im-
proved instrumentation, technique, and accuracy of polygraphy
have generally denied admission on the basis of the "general accept-
ance" standard.3 8
35. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the defendant was convicted
but was released from jail three years later when another person was arrested for and con-
fessed to the murder. R. FaaGUsoN, JR. & A. MIU.ER, supra note 23, at 27 (citing N.Y. JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, FOURTEENTH ANN. REP. 265 (1948)).
36. 293 F. at 1014.
37. E.g., Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1953), in which the Florida Supreme
Court quoted blindly from Frye in reference to a "systolic blood pressure deception test" 30
years after such a machine ceased to exist.
38. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 208, at 506 (1972).
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Modern evidentiary scholars roundly condemn adherence to the
Frye "general acceptance" standard which was established fifty-five
years ago and which has almost universally barred admissibility of
polygraph evidence. So eminent an authority as McCormick has
remarked:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking
judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are
supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless
there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, probative value
may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or mis-
leading the jury, and undue consumption of time. If the courts
used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement
of "general acceptance" not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive
at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific advances .3
Furthermore, the definition of "relevancy" in the new Federal
Rules of Evidence supports the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence."' 0 Thus, the federal standard of relevancy is
whether the offered evidence alters the probability of the existence
of a disputed material fact.
Arguably, any procedure which offered an improvement over
mere chance or randomness would satisfy this federal relevancy
requirement. Therefore, since even the most pessimistic assess-
ments of polygraphy's accuracy are substantially greater than
chance, polygraph evidence appears to be prima facie admissible
under the federal rules. Yet, even though it would seem that a
federal court logically must be compelled to admit polygraph evi-
dence, it is entirely possible that a given court may exclude such
evidence. Federal courts may exclude polygraph evidence not be-
cause it speaks to an ultimate issue of fact, which is allowed under
the federal rules," but because it may be too prejudicial.,2
39. Id. § 203, at 491 (footnotes omitted). Professor McCormick is supported in his views
by Wigmore, J. WIGMORE, 2 EVIDENCE § 990 (2d ed. 1923), and Richardson, J. RICHARDSON,
MODERN SCIENTIFM EVIDENCE ch. 10 (2d ed. 1974). The reader should note that even a limited
survey of PSYCHOLOGICAL ABSTRACTS from 1973 to date shows over 50 professional journal
articles dealing with polygraphy, as either a research tool or an object of research, in the
disciplines of psychology and psychophysiology. Thus, an argument exists that the current
state of the polygraphy art satisfies even the too rigorous "general acceptance" rule.
40. FED. R. EVID. 401.
41. FED. R. EVID. 704 states: "Testimony . . . otherwise admissible is not objectionable
19781 1381
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Bias is a legitimate concern, especially in the typical trial in
which the jury must determine the ultimate issues after hearing
lengthy, complex, conflicting, and often boring testimony. As a
juror, why make a difficult situation impossible by trying to
"weigh" the evidence? Why not instead lean toward the party who
presents polygraph evidence, since the "truth machine" has the
support of the experts? Such a scenario may indeed occur should
polygraph evidence become admissible. However, it should not be
assumed that juries would abrogate their solemnly sworn duty, par-
ticularly if judges cautioned against such a course by standard in-
structions on this type of evidence.43
The final and telling argument against continued application of
the Frye rule is found in developing decisional law. Polygraph evi-
dence, although almost universally excluded when offered against
timely objection, is now admissible in almost one-third of the states
when offered pursuant to stipulation." That courts have begun to
relax their strict exclusionary rules regarding polygraph evidence
merely because opposing parties have stipulated to the admissibil-
ity of such evidence-a condition which in no way enhances the
reliability, accuracy, or weight of the polygraphist's report or lessens
any prejudicial effect the evidence might carry-highlights the ex-
treme judicial ambivalence to polygraphy. Furthermore, permitting
admission of polygraph evidence pursuant to stipulation may be a
sign that unrestricted admissibility over objection, a theme of sev-
eral recent landmark cases, is soon to become a reality.
II. FLORIDA LAW
A. The Legal Status of Direct Use of Polygraph Evidence
Kaminski v. State established the Florida rule that results of
polygraph tests are not admissible into evidence over objection by
any party to the litigation.45 Florida, however, is among a growing
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
42. FED. R. EVID. 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighted by the danger of unfair prejudice ....
43. There is some evidence to show that juries will not be unduly swayed by polygraph
evidence. See Tarlow, supra note 16, at 968-69, for an account of one jury's reaction to
polygraph evidence and its effect on the decisionmaking process.
44. See id. at 953 for an extensive list of citations.
45. 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953). The only question before the Kaminski court was whether
testimony indicating witness submission to polygraph testing was admissible for purposes of
witness rehabilitation. Holding such testimony inadmissible, the court noted that a contrary
finding would result in allowing, "by inference, the admission of damaging evidence that
would not have been legally admissible had it been submitted directly." Id. at 341. Thus,
the Kaminski court, by implication and without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, an-
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minority of jurisdictions that admit polygraph results into evidence
when the parties stipulate to their admission." Such stipulations
are binding and enforceable, whether made orally or in writing.,'
In addition to refusing to admit test results, Florida courts have
restricted other references to polygraph use. Testimony which gives
rise to an inference about the results of a polygraph examination is
inadmissible. 8 Florida courts also disallow questioning which re-
veals a willingness by a witness or a party to submit to polygraphy.1"
Although admission of testimony which violates either of these con-
ditions generally constitutes harmful error, there have been some
exceptions to the absolute bar against inadvertent polygraph testi-
mony.0
In 1974, in Sullivan v. State, the Florida Supreme Court found
that the admission of testimony which arguably gave rise to an
inference about the results of a polygraph test was harmless error. 5'
The court admonished prosecutorial overreaching in the form of
eliciting testimony from a key witness which gave rise to a possible
inference that polygraph results damaging to the defense had been
obtained. Yet, although the Sullivan court indicated it would not
tolerate such behavior, four factors rendered the error harmless in
that case. First, the defense counsel failed or deliberately chose not
to take advantage of the trial court's offer to instruct the jury to
disregard the polygraph reference. Second, the reference was ambig-
uous and could not be said conclusively to give rise to an interpreta-
swered a question not before the court and established precedent which has endured for a
quarter of a century.
46. Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975); Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Other jurisdictions which admit polygraph evidence upon stipulation
are: Arizona, State v. Valdez, 371 P.2d 894 (Ariz. 1962); California, People v. Davis, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 242 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Illinois, People v. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1972); Indiana, Carpenter v. State, 241 N.E.2d 347 (Ind. 1968); Iowa, State v.
Galloway, 167 N.W.2d 89 (Iowa 1969); Kansas, State v. Lassley, 545 P.2d 383 (Kan. 1976);
Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 313 N.E.2d 120 (Mass. 1974); Missouri, State
v. Fields, 434 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1968); New Jersey, State v. McDavitt, 297 A.2d 849 (N.J.
1972); New Mexico, State v. Lucero, 526 P.2d 1091 (N.M. 1974); North Carolina, State v.
Steele, 219 S.E.2d 540 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); Oregon, State v. Bennett, 521 P.2d 31 (Or. Ct.
App. 1974); Utah, State v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1974); Washington, State v. Ross,
497 P.2d 1343 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972); Wisconsin, State v. Stanislawski, 216 N.W.2d 8 (Wis.
1974).
See Tarlow, supra note 16; Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973).
47. Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975). See also Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
48. Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976); Kamin-
ski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953).
49. Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976). Al-
though Sullivan stands for this proposition, its holding created the exception to that rule.
50. See id.; Pinkney v. State, 241 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1970).
51. 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974).
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tion prejudicial to the defendant. Third, the witness never referred
to the results of the polygraph test in any manner. And fourth, the
evidence of the defendant's guilt, including his prior confession, was
so overwhelming that the one reference could not be said to have
caused a miscarriage of justice necessitating a reversal of his convic-
tion. 12
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court held in Pinkney v. State
that the admission of testimony which indicated whether a witness
or a party was or had been willing to be polygraphed was harmless
error. 53 In Pinkney, the prosecutor asked the arresting officer
whether the defendant made any statements upon arrest. The offi-
cer replied that the defendant, who was charged with rape, had
requested a lie detector test. The court sustained an objection to this
response and cautioned the jury to disregard the answer. Defen-
dant's motion for mistrial was denied. On appeal, the supreme court
offered no rationale for finding the trial court's denial of the defen-
dant's motion for mistrial proper. The supreme court simply cited
Belk v. State4 to support its finding of harmless error.5
In Belk, a state's witness testified on cross-examination that he
had remarked "about a lie detector test" to the defendant. Defense
counsel interrupted the witness just after the reference to the poly-
graph test and moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion
and instructed the jury to disregard the answer. The appellate court
found no harmful error where (1) mention of the lie detector test was
elicited by the defendant on cross-examination (2) there was no
reason on record to find that the witness was doing anything other
than making an honest effort to answer the defendant's question, (3)
the jury was carefully instructed to disregard the remark, and (4)
the reference was casual and without particular meaning or harm
to the defendant.
In summary, Florida has two general rules regarding the admissi-
bility of polygraph evidence. First, neither the results, nor any refer-
ence to the results, of polygraph tests are admissible into evidence 57
except upon stipulation of the parties. 51 Second, the admission of
any evidence which could give rise to an inference about the results
52. Id. at 635-36.
53. 241 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1970); accord, Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974); Belk
v. State, 167 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
54. 167 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
55. 241 So. 2d at 382.
56. 167 So. 2d at 240-41.
57. Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953).
58. Codie v. State, 313 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1975).
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of a polygraph test constitutes harmful error" except when: (1) the
evidence is ambiguous insofar as it relates to the results of polygra-
phy, (2) the jury is given cautionary instructions to disregard the
evidence or counsel waives the right to such instructions, (3) the
evidence arose unintentionally and with no showing of bad faith by
any party, (4) other evidence is so overwhelming that the reference
cannot be construed as a miscarriage of justice, and (5) no reference
to the actual results is made. 0
B. Indirect Uses of Polygraph Evidence
In Florida, voluntary post-polygraph examination statements or
admissions made to the polygraph examiner are admissible." Tradi-
tionally, only those statements or admissions which related to the
subject matter of the polygraph test were deemed admissible. 2 Prior
to 1976, State v. Cunningham established the Florida rule regarding
admissibility of statements made by defendants to polygraphers . 3
In Cunningham, the defendant had been charged with robbery.
The defendant protested his innocence, and it was stipulated that
he would submit to a polygraph examination, the results of which
would be introduced at trial. During the examination, the polygraph
operator asked the defendant whether he had ever killed anyone.
The defendant said he had not. At the conclusion of the test, the
polygraph operator told the defendant that he had lied about never
having killed anyone. The examiner said that this would affect the
results of the test regarding the defendant's involvement in the
robbery. The defendant then admitted that some years earlier he
had been involved in a robbery which resulted in a death. The
polygraph operator subsequently informed the prosecutor of the de-
59. Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976); Kamin-
ski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953).
60. Sullivan v. State, 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976); Pinkney
v. State, 241 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1970).
61. Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1977).
62. Id. In Burch, a murder suspect had been vigorously questioned for five and one-half
hours, confronted with fabricated incriminating evidence, and given a mock polygraph test
in order to lever a confession. The defendant maintained that he was innocent until told that
he had failed the polygraph test, that the detective interrogating him would decide whether
he would be charged with first- or second-degree murder, that the detective wanted to believe
that the defendant had not premeditated the murder, and that the defendant should consider
the difference between a capital crime and a seven- to twenty-year sentence in deciding
whether to confess. At this point the defendant confessed. But at trial the defendant argued
that his confession was involuntary. On review, the supreme court found the confession to be
voluntary. Subsequently, in Hostzclaw v. State, 351 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 1977), the supreme court
cited Burch for the proposition that voluntary post-polygraph statements to the examiner are
admissible.
63. 324 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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fendant's admission. Soon thereafter the prosecutor instituted first-
degree murder proceedings against the defendant on the basis of
information gleaned by the polygraph operator. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to suppress the statements made to
the polygraph operator. The appellate court affirmed, finding that
"[t]he sole purpose of the stipulation entered into in the Overhead
Door Company [robbery] case related to permissible evidence in
that cause and in no other." 4
Under Cunningham then, a defendant's statement to a polygraph
examiner after completion of a stipulated examination would be
admissible against that defendant only in the proceeding that was
the source of the stipulation. Consequently, post-examination state-
ments could not be used against the defendant in other criminal
matters. Recently, however, in Hostzclaw v. State, the Florida Su-
preme Court expanded the ambit of admissibility for voluntary
statements or admissions made to polygraph examiners.6 5
The defendant in Hostzclaw volunteered information to police
investigators and a grand jury which implicated another person in
the killing of a police officer. The defendant gave no information to
indicate that he was involved in the murder. But when discrepan-
cies between the defendant's testimony and certain facts became
apparent, a polygraph test was arranged. After the test, the defen-
dant made statements to the polygraph operator which apparently
implicated him as an aider and abettor to the murder. The trial
64. Id. at 174 (emphasis added). Judge Pearson dissented and would have allowed the
confession into evidence on the authority of Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1964). In Johnson, the prosecutor introduced testimony from a polygraph operator
during the case-in-chief. The witness was not identified as a polygraph operator, nor as a
police officer, but was allowed to testify from his notes that the defendant admitted that a
story he initially told the witness-examiner (that the defendant was not at the scene of the
crime) was untrue. On cross-examination by defense counsel, the witness-examiner testified
that his conversation with the defendant resulted from a police request that he administer a
polygraph test. The court foreclosed any further exploration of the subject of a polygraph
examination by the prosecution on redirect examination.
The appellate court found the defendant was not prejudiced by the polygrapher's testimony
implying that the defendant had taken a polygraph test and had failed in at least one respect.
The court reasoned that there was no prejudice because
the only reference made with respect to Johnson's 'telling the truth' was with
respect to his initial denial that he was at the scene of the incident. He subsequently
recanted and admitted having been here [sic]. Thus, even if the jury speculated
that the (inferred) lie detector examination 'proved' he was initially lying this did
not prejudice him.
Id. at 805.
65. 351 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 1977).
66. Although neither the results of the test nor the post-test statements are divulged in
the reported decisions, the trial court's order (reproduced verbatim in State v. Hostzclaw,
351 So. 2d 1033, 1034-35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)) indicates that it was not until after
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court held these statements inadmissible on the authority of
Cunningham.7 But the appellate court in Hostzclaw held that when
a witness in a criminal investigation voluntarily submits to a poly-
graph examination for the purpose of verifying his testimony, post-
test statements made to the examiner will be admissible against
him in any subsequent criminal proceedings. 6 8 The Florida Supreme
Court, on conflict certiorari, took jurisdiction over the Hostzclaw
case to determine the ambit of admissibility for post-test state-
ments made to polygraph examiners. 9
In 1977, in Hostzclaw, the supreme court held that the defen-
dant's post-test statements were admissible. Cunningham was ex-
plicitly overruled to the extent that it was inconsistent with the new
holding. 0 The practical effect of the Hostzclaw decision was to cre-
ate a stipulation where there had been none previously. A logical
reading of the case leads to the conclusion that any post-test state-
ments or admissions to a polygraph operator will be admissible
against the declarant in subsequent proceedings. Dicta in the
Hostzclaw opinion bolsters this supposition and arguably presages
a judicial disposition toward absolute admissibility for all state-
ments made to a polygraph examiner. This perhaps could include
even the fact that the declarant was subjected to a polygraph exami-
nation.7 Such a reading of Hostzclaw is admittedly broad. However,
the polygraph tests that the defendant made admissions to an investigator for the state
attorney's office.
67. Id. at 1035.
68. Id. at 1036.
69. 351 So. 2d 970.
70. Id. at 972.
71. Although unnecessary to support its decision, the Hostzclaw court quoted favorably
from Johnson v. State, 166 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). The Johnson court stated:
The established rule that neither the result of a polygraph examination nor any
allusion to such an examination to imply a certain result is admissible or proper
• . . does not, in our view, label the polygraph a tree whose every fruit is forbidden.
Perhaps the most frequent instances of a jury being advised of a defendant's
having taken a lie detector test are in cases involving confessions or admissions
procured in anticipation of, during or subsequent to administration of a lie detector
examination. It is well established that the mere fact that a lie detector examina-
tion may have been involved in procuring a confession does not render the confes-
sion inadmissible. . . . However, if the defendant is forced to submit to the exami-
nation or if the methods of examination are such as to constitute actual or psychol-
ogical coercion the resulting confession may well be found involuntary.
Necessarily, when a confession procured during or as a result of a lie detector
examination is challenged, the facts surrounding the confession will be disclosed.
If the court determines the evidence competent, these same facts-including the
fact that the defendant was subjected to a lie detector-may be disclosed to the
jury as bearing on the confession's credibility.
Id. at 801-03 (citations omitted).
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it is notable that even a narrower reading-that all post-test state-
ments or admissions to a polygraph operator will be admissible
against the declarant-denotes greater judicial acceptance of poly-
graphy.
The favorable judicial attitude toward polygraphy embodied in
Hostzclaw, however, is one which lays a treacherous trap for the
clients of unwary defense attorneys. Should an attorney have his
client stipulate to a polygraph test, he must ensure that the exam-
iner's questions are precisely formulated and strictly limited to the
legally relevant issues. If otherwise, and if the examiner is allowed
broad latitude in question formulation, it is possible that a subject
may be questioned about criminal activity beyond the scope of the
events which gave rise to the stipulation.72 Any post-test admission
or statement made to the examiner, albeit irrelevant and impermis-
sible evidence in the pending action, could be admissible against the
declarant in a subsequent proceeding." Thus, Hostzclaw mandates
that attorneys who allow their clients to enter into polygraph stipu-
lations should preclude examiner questioning which is irrelevant to
the subject matter of the stipulation, lest they risk additional legal
problems for those clients.
IV. THE LEGAL FRONTIER
Recently, several state courts have admitted the results of poly-
graph tests into evidence in nonjury cases where the tests were
either ordered or accepted by the trial judge to assist him in ruling
on a nonjury issue.7" This procedure could become popular, espe-
72. As, for example, the defendant in Cunningham was questioned about whether he had
ever killed anyone. This question was posed during a polygraph examination stipulated to
for the purpose of determining whether he was involved in a robbery.
73. Attorneys might attempt to limit the scope of examiner questioning by specifying such
limitation in the written stipulation. However, any violation of the limitation which resulted
in a confession or admission (particularly to a heinous crime) might force the courts to
balance the public interest in punishing criminals against the public interest in enforcing or
interpreting stipulation contracts strictly against the state. The reiult of such a balancing
test is at best uncertain and at worst disastrous for the client.
74. See Note, The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1120, 1134-36
(1973), for a discussion of cases. In State v. Watson, 278 A.2d 543 (N.J. Hudson County Ct.
1971), the court permitted the defendant to introduce exculpatory polygraph results at a post-
trial sentencing proceeding. The court in People v. Cutter, 12 Cami. L. REP. (BNA) 2133 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1972), admitted polygraph evidence at a suppression hearing on the issue of
whether the defendant had consented to a search. In In re Stenzel v. B., 336 N.Y.S.2d 839
(Niagara County Fam. Ct. 1972), the defendant was allowed to introduce test results in a
paternity suit to show the mother's deception regarding her sexual behavior. Lastly, the court
in Walther v. O'Connell, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Queens County Civ. Ct. 1972), ordered a poly-
graph test to resolve directly conflicting testimony regarding the making of a loan where no
witnesses were present.
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cially in civil litigation, since civil trial courts often face difficult
credibility-of-witness questions. Also, nonjury trial courts tradition-
ally have admitted types of evidence which never have been permit-
ted before a jury. Developments in the jury trial area have primarily
been in federal courts.
In four recent cases, federal district courts have admitted unsti-
pulated polygraph evidence: United States v. Ridling,7 5 United
States v. Zeiger,7 United States v. Dioguardi,77 and United States
v. Hart.78 Decided in the same week, Ridling and Zeiger were re-
ported as landmark decisions signaling the demise of the Frye rule.79
Later, however, Zeiger was reversed per curiam by the appellate
court.
80
A well-reasoned opinion, Ridling is good precedent because the
polygraph evidence offered was on the ultimate issue. Ridling in-
volved a perjury prosecution. The court made two findings regard-
ing polygraph evidence. First, the court implicitly rejected the Frye
rule, insofar as it is based on the unreliability of the polygraph. The
court found this conclusion to be at odds with the reality of poly-
graph instrumentation and technique, which have greatly improved
in the past decade. Second, the court found that the process by
which scientific evidence becomes admissible at trial is a bifurcated
procedure. Initially, the underlying scientific theory must be proved
at each trial through expert testimony. Then, as the gradual, cumu-
lative effect of such testimony serves to establish the theory firmly
in the judicial consciousness, it becomes an appropriate subject for
judicial notice. Based on the evidence presented, the Ridling court
concluded that the present state of the art had reached the first
stage and that test results should be admitted after establishment
of the reliability of the process by expert testimony.8
The court went even further toward debunking the traditional
objections to polygraph evidence, stating that under the Federal
Rules of Evidence the relevancy of polygraph evidence is as great
as that offered by other scientific tests such as radar, breathalizer,
75. 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
76. 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
77. Crim. No. 72-1102 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), cited in The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial,
supra note 74, at 1129. Although this case is not officially reported, The Emergence of the
Polygraph at Trial, supra note 74, at 1133, contains a good discussion of the case based on
information gleaned from the press, the court record, and discussions with the trial court's
clerks.
78. 344 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
79. See The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, supra note 74, at 1129.
80. 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
81. 350 F. Supp. at 95.
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and blood tests.2 Additionally, the court said that the taking of a
polygraph test after receiving Miranda warnings constitutes a
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 The court said
too that although polygraph evidence is arguably hearsay, it should
be admissible nevertheless under an exception to the hearsay rule
because of its high degree of trustworthiness."'
The Ridling court admitted that the inadequate professional-
ization of polygraph examiners created a threat of fraud on the
court. Finding a practical solution by exercising its power to appoint
experts, the court held that both parties must meet and recommend
three competent polygraph examiners, other than those offered by
the defendant.8 The court would then choose one or more of these
experts to administer a polygraph test to the defendant. If the re-
sults clearly showed that the defendant was lying or that he was
telling the truth, they would be admitted. Should the test results
be ambiguous or should the defendant refuse to cooperate in the
tests, no polygraph evidence would be admitted.86 This solution to
the examiner reliability problem is certain to gain adherents as
more courts begin to face these issues.
Charged with falsifying a loan application, the defendant in
Dioguardi attempted to introduce polygraph results supporting his
innocence. 7 In an approach similar to that used in Ridling, the
Dioguardi court ruled that if the defendant and another man who
had confessed to the crime would both submit to tests given by a
court-appointed expert, both results would be admissible before the
jury.8 Apparently the results of the court-appointed expert matched
those offered by the defendant because the government dismissed
the indictment.89
In Zeiger, the defendant was charged with armed assault with
intent to kill.9 0 In contrast to the tightly drawn admissibility re-
quirements of Ridling and Dioguardi, the Zeiger trial court allowed
the defendant to introduce the results of a test given to him by the
Washington, D.C. police prior to his arrest. Noting that the govern-
ment did not refute two defense psychologists' testimony that the
82. Id. at 96.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 99.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. For a discussion of the facts of this unreported case, see The Emergence of the Poly-
graph at Trial, supra note 74, at 1133.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 350 F. Supp. 685.
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polygraph was at least eighty-five percent reliable, the court found
the results admissible9' despite the defendant's written stipulation
that the test results would not be introduced at his trial.9 On ap-
peal, Zeiger was reversed per curiam without an opinion. Hence, the
grounds for reversal are unknown.93
As in Zeiger, the prosecution in Hart had given a polygraph exam
but did not want to disclose the results.94 Hart involved the prosecu-
tion of two former federal narcotics agents on charges of soliciting
bribes. Unlike the Zeiger situation where the government tried to
block admission of the defendant's test results, in. Hart the govern-
ment tried to suppress the results of a polygraph test given to its
principal witness. The witness was a confessed narcotics dealer, and
the results of the test showed that he was lying."5 During cross-
examination, the court learned that the witness had been given a
polygraph test. When it discovered further that the government had
known the results prior to putting the witness on the stand, the
court declared a mistrial. The court also ruled that the government
had to explain why it had given the witness a polygraph exam and
then disregarded the results."
The Hart court relied on Brady v. Maryland,9 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that the government has a duty
to disclose any exculpatory evidence. The Hart court reasoned that
the government's duty to disclose extended to any investigations
which indicated that a government witness was lying.9 Actually,
the only ruling on admissibility was the denial of a motion to intro-
duce the results of tests the defendants had taken to prove their
innocence.99 However, the Hart court's ruling can be seen as an
indirect judicial recognition of the polygraph's validity. By placing
a burden on the government to justify its failure to proceed accord-
ing to the test results of witnesses, the court showed confidence in
the accuracy of polygraph readings. Furthermore, the extension of
91. Id. at 690, 692.
92. See The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, supra note 74, at 1132.
93. One commentator who has studied the briefs filed by both parties feels that the
reversal may have been grounded on an objection to the circumstances surrounding this
particular test, although he does not elaborate further as to the source of the problem. Id. at
1133.
94. 344 F. Supp. at 523.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 524.
97. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
98. 344 F. Supp. at 523.
99. Id. at 524. The court stated that with regard to admission of the defendant's test
results, it felt bound by earlier decisions, particularly the definite statement by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833, 841 (2d Cir. 1957).
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the Brady rule will offer defendants added protection against arbi-
trary and bad faith prosecutions which otherwise might be con-
ducted without fear of exposure.'"
In summary, the Zeiger and Dioguardi decisions, although en-
couraging for polygraphy proponents, are not helpful as precedent
because the former was overruled and the latter was unreported.
The Ridling and Hart decisions, however, are both well reasoned
and should provide persuasive support for trial courts presented
with the opportunity to admit unstipulated polygraph evidence over
objection through expert testimony.
V. CONCLUSION
Formerly considered a "black art," polygraphy now stands closer
to the threshold of complete judicial acceptance. Although the ma-
jority of courts still erroneously apply the "general acceptance"
standard to polygraph evidence, more than one-third of the states
now admit polygraph evidence pursuant to stipulation. 0' As ardent
advocates continue to present cautious courts with evidence of re-
cent state-of-the-art advances, 0 2 the trend toward universal admis-
sion of polygraph evidence should accelerate sharply.
Lawyers should welcome polygraphy's entrance into the judicial
arena, for reliance on polygraphy could eliminate spurious or bad
faith claims and testimony, thereby enhancing the integrity of the
judicial process and reducing Bakunin's remark that "jurisprudence
[is] the science of the human lie" to a mere historical curiosity.0 3
100. Note that had the Brady argument been advanced in Zeiger, it is possible that the
admission of the polygraph test given to the defendant by the police might have been upheld.
101. See note 46 supra.
102. For a thorough discussion of the latest developments in polygraphy technique, instru-
mentation, and research, see T. REID & F. INBAU, TRmH AND DECE ON (2d ed. 1977). This
book contains an excellent section on polygraph law and extensive bibliographies.
103. See note 3 supra.
